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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
DILEMMAS IN THE DEFINITION AND DESIGN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Bruce Pruitt-Hamm
Abstract: Human rights abuse is a significant problem in Southeast Asia. The end
of the Cold War has led to trends toward greater use of international interventionary
force for humanitarian objectives. This Comment proposes that rather than defining or
re-interpreting international law to allow military intervention for humanitarian purposes,
a Southeast Asian regional human rights regime should be formed, involving greater
development and acceptance of non-military forms of intervention.
I. INTRODUCTION
The abuse of human rights is a serious international problem.
Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives or suffered inhuman
treatment in places like Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia.' The
prevalence of such abuse has led to the development of a concept of
"humanitarian intervention," which, in the past, served as a moral and legal
justification for military intervention into one state by another state to pre-
vent human rights abuse perpetrated by the target state. Historically,
humanitarian intervention has been selectively used, often as pretext for
intervention into the affairs of smaller states by militarily stronger states.
2
I Although recent events in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia have significiant implications for much of
the analysis in this Comment, the scope was necessarily limited to discussion of the controversial issues
surrounding humanitarian intervention as they apply to Southeast Asia.
2 Tom Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville. in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 150 (R. Lillich ed., 1973) ("It was generally conceded that dur-
ing the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the phrase 'humanitarian intervention' was used
frequently to describe and to justify armed intervention by Western States in the rest of the world. Indeed,
no one demurred to the proposition that, in this respect, humanitarian intervention may have enjoyed a
priority of usage."). See also HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N. 10-I 1 (R. Lillich ed., 1973)
[hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N.] (quoting Professor William D. Rogers on
humanitarian intervention as historically the most often used pretext for strong nations to intervene in the
affairs of weaker nations, "We are talking about a concept which was international legal rationalization for
the most important intrusions of great powers into the lives and social structures of small and weak powers
in recent history." Professor Richard A. Falk continues this point by noting that the issue of defining
humanitarian intervention so as to safeguard against its misuse is only relevant for those nations with the
military power to engage in the practice. Id Falk notes the importance of explicitly recognizing the
asymmetry between "political inequality and the pretense ofjuristic equality.").
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Nominally offered as a means to end human suffering, humanitarian
intervention risks the possibility of heightened suffering through increased
inter-state conflict. Humanitarian intervention risks inter-state conflict by
allowing states to forcibly impose values regarding the proper limits to
governmental powers onto other states. Thus, humanitarian intervention
represents a continuing dilemma for international law between concerns for
justice and concerns for peace.
This Comment analyzes this dilemma as it applies to the unique
situation in Southeast Asian countries in the post-Cold War era.3 Southeast
Asia is unique with respect to humanitarian intervention issues for several
reasons. Unlike all the other regions of the world, neither Asia nor
Southeast Asia has a regional human rights regime to define, adjudicate or
encourage compliance with human rights norms. The lack of such a regime,
combined with regional economic and demographic conditions, creates a
high likelihood that human rights abuses will remain unidentified or unre-
medied until severe measures like humanitarian intervention seem
necessary. In addition, Southeast Asian nations, along with China, have
been in the forefront of those states mounting philosophical challenges to
international efforts to broaden the scope of universal human rights.
Finally, considering the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to China and
China's power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it seems
unlikely that the Security Council will authorize humanitarian intervention
in Southeast Asia.
In the post-Cold War era there is an emerging trend whereby the UN
Security Council is using its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter to engage in humanitarian intervention. 4 According to many
international law scholars, in the past, the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion under customary law was overruled by the overriding concern for peace
and the emergence of the fundamental norms of non-intervention and non-
use of force in the United Nations Charter.5 During the Cold War, however,
3 For this Comment the Southeast Asian region includes Brunei, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
4 Chapter VII is entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts
of aggression" and establishes the mechanisms for determining when a threat or breach has occurred and
how the United Nations may respond, including the potential use of military force authorized by the
Security Council. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
5 See generally Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 217 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) (arguing that the Charter precludes, and/or has become, the rele-
vant customary norm; that it clearly prohibits forcible humanitarian intervention; and that the customary
VOL. 3 No. I
HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
the United Nations proved to be ineffective in halting appalling human
rights abuses, such as those committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
In the post-Cold War era, the past ineffectiveness of the United Nations has
led to a trend toward more frequent and more militarily aggressive
peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. Under an implied
authority derived from its Chapter .VII enforcement powers to remedy
"threats to the peace," the Security Council is broadening the legal basis for
humanitarian intervention by the United Nations. 6
This trend poses dilemmas of definition and design of international
law, which are particularly apparent in the case of Southeast Asia.7 In order
to halt significant abuses of human rights in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold
War period, should humanitarian military intervention by the UN Security
Council be encouraged, even though historically there is a demonstrated
risk that it may be misused by the more powerful states? What strategies
offer the best path out of the dilemma between abuse and misuse?8
Many legal scholars argue that misuse of humanitarian intervention
can be controlled by adopting a clearly defined doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, primarily through an expanded interpretation of the UN
Charter.9 This Comment argues that such hope is misplaced, because the
norm immediately preceding adoption of the Charter, if it were deemed to survive as an adjunct to the
Charter, would also prohibit humanitarian intervention).
6 See David Scheffer, Toward A Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.
253 (1992).
7 In this Comment, "mechanisms of legal design" refers to the processes of constitutive law. This
type of law designs structures and processes regarding who has legal authority for what kinds of actions or
decisions. It emphasizes the distribution of power to various entities in the government or society, such as
the "checks and balances" found in the separation of powers designed into the United States Constitution.
See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991). The definition of doctrine primarily in-
volve issues of defining and interpreting substantive normative law.
8 In order to maintain clarity, the term "abuse" is used in this Comment in reference to human rights
abuse. The term "misuse" is used in reference to use, by states, of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention to justify intervention in other states for other than humanitarian purposes, while claiming
humanitarian intent.
9 See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 48-49 (quoting Professor John
N. Moore describing the criteria for allowable humanitarian intervention which he, and other scholars he
mentions, advocate). See also Wil D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 57, 74-5 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) (advocating a "number of conditions
... which relevant U.N. organs could apply as an informal quasi-legality standard"); David Scheffer, The
Persian Gulf-Crisis, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 60, 63, 69 ("[T]he era of being intimidated by the provi-
sion [sic] of the U.N. Charter is over. The charter is a flexible document and can be interpreted as such,";
and "we have reached the stage where.., the use of force.., is a legitimate tool for the enforcement of
international law."). See generally, W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
1994
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concept of humanitarian intervention is inherently vulnerable to subjective
interpretation, and is therefore ripe for misuse. To maximize the recogni-
tion of and compliance with human rights norms in Southeast Asia,
international law should instead emphasize changes in international
structures and processes (what this Comment terms issues of "design").
The dilemmas of humanitarian intervention in Southeast Asia are better
resolved by emphasizing such mechanisms of legal design rather than
renewing debate over the definition of doctrine.10 Specifically, Southeast
Asian governments should form a regional human rights regime similar to
those found in Africa, Europe and the Americas. At the same time, human
rights activists should encourage the development and acceptance of non-
military forms of intervention.
This Comment is organized into five parts to analyze these issues.
Following this introduction, Part II illustrates the problem of human rights
abuse in Southeast Asia. Section A examines selected countries in
Southeast Asia with problematic human rights records, with a particular
focus on Cambodia. Section B analyzes the unique situation in Southeast
Asia regarding humanitarian intervention. Part III provides a brief history
of the development of humanitarian intervention, identifies current trends
toward an expanded doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold
War period and considers its application in Southeast Asia. Part IV explains
how the basic concepts inherent in a definition of humanitarian intervention
are subject to varying interpretations and do not deter misuse in its applica-
tion. These interpretive difficulties are analyzed under the elements of a
model definition of humanitarian intervention and as they apply to
Southeast Asia in particular. Part V proposes functional approaches to legal
design involving international legal structures and processes as alternatives
to definitional strategies. The potential and effectiveness of several ap-
proaches are explored, including: restructuring the United Nations Security
Council; negotiating a regional Southeast Asian framework convention on
human rights; and increasing the development of non-military strategies and
technologies in humanitarian intervention.
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 866, 875 (arguing that "new criteria for unilateral human rights
actions must be established," most particularly with intervention to support democratic governance).
10 See supranote 7.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE TREND TOWARD
INTERVENTION
A. Southeast Asia: The Problem of Human Rights Abuse
Many Southeast Asian countries experience human rights abuses,
which are often due to domestic conflicts, such as civil wars or insurrec-
tions.11 The United Nations has recently engaged in humanitarian
intervention in other parts of the world to remedy instances of substantial
human rights abuse. However, Southeast Asia may expect to be treated
differently, due to the geopolitical alignment of China and its permanent
seat on the Security Council. The recent history of Cambodia12 in particular
demonstrates the gravity of the problem and the contrast between current
and past approaches of the international community. The human rights
situations in Papua New Guinea, Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Indonesia
are also briefly surveyed at the end of Part II.A.
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) militarily de-
feated Cambodia's authoritarian ruler Lon Nol in April of 1975. Fanatical
policies were implemented in an attempt to completely restructure
Cambodian society and wipe out all foreign influence.13 In the process, the
Khmer Rouge killed between one and two million Cambodians out of a total
population of 7.3 million within less than four years. 14  A special
rapporteur for the United Nations concluded in his report that "this was the
worst case of human rights violations since the Nazi era." 15
The international response was minimal and ineffective. 16 Cambodia
was largely sealed off from the outside world. In addition, the United States
public was tired of hearing about Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War.
Only two newspaper staff reporters from the U.S. were left to cover a region
11 See Robin Wright, The New Tribalism: Defending Human Rights in an Age of Ethnic Conflict,
L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993. at 8 (surveying ethnic and religious conflicts in Asia and the world) [hereinafter
The New Tribalism].
12 In this Comment, 'Cambodia' is used rather than 'Kampuchea'. 'Kampuchea' is based on local
usage, whereas 'Cambodia' is more widely accepted for international usage.
13 See Karl D. Jackson, The Khmer Rouge in Context, in CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH
DEATH 3 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989). See generally ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER:
CAMBODIA'S REVOLUTION AND THE VOICES OF ITS PEOPLE 217-298 (1986).
14 See BECKER, supra note 13, at 20; see also Jackson, supra note 13, at 3.
15 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1335 (1979) (the Rapporteur appointed by the Subcommission for the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Minorities), noted in Gregory H. Stanton, Kampuchean
Genocide and the World Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 341, 341.
16 Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 3 (1993).
1994
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
that had been blanketed by American press for years. 17 After several states
finally brought the reports of the atrocities to the attention of the UN
Human Rights Commission's Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1978, the Commission re-
quested a formal response to the allegations from Democratic Kampuchea
(Khmer Rouge). The Cambodian authorities rejected the request "with
chilling invective."18
In contrast, international reaction to the invasion of Cambodia by
Vietnam was more significant. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978
and established the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which con-
trolled most of Cambodia throughout the 1980s. 19 In reaction, the UN
General Assembly called for withdrawal of all "foreign forces" and ac-
cepted the credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean (Khmer Rouge)
delegation at the UN rather than seating the Vietnam-supported People's
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).20 Vietnam justified its invasion as self-
defense to Cambodian raids stemming from a border dispute with
Cambodia.21 The failure of the international community to mount a multi-
lateral response to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge lent greater credibility
to the argument that Vietnam's invasion was a necessary act of humanitar-
ian intervention.22
The road to peace in Cambodia was long and hard. In protest of the
Vietnamese aggression, the United Nations continued to recognize the
Khmer Rouge, who were supported by China, and reject the legitimacy of
the PRK.23 The UN General Assembly demanded the withdrawal of
17 See BECKER, supra note 13, at 372-75.
18 See Ratner, supra note 16, at 4 n. II (citing Question of the Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other
Dependent Countries and Territories. Note by the Secretary-General. U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1295-
E/CN.4/Sub.2/418 (1978) (containing note of April 22, 1978, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Democratic Kampuchea)).
19 Ratner, supra note 16, at 3.
20 GA Res. 34/22, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Ist-32d plen. mtgs., at 56-57, U.N. Docs. A/34L 1-32 (1979). See also Ratner, supra
note 16, at 3 (noting that the first international convention was convened in 1981 by the General Assembly
but "focused on the Vietnamese invasion, not the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge").
21 Ratner, supra note 16, at 3.
22 See, e.g., GARY KLINTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
41-84 (I989) (justifying the 1978"invasion as humanitarian intervention).2 3 See U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Ist-32d plen. mtgs. at 56-57. U.N. Docs. A/34/PV.I-32 (1979)
(accepting credentials of Democratic Kampuchean delegation). See generally Ratner, supra note 16, at 3-
4.
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Vietnam from Cambodia as a pre-condition of peace in Cambodia.24 It was
not until December of 1987, that Prince Sihanouk,25 representing a coalition
of Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian factions, began direct negotiations
with Hun Sen, the Vietnamese-supported PRK Prime Minister. The
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) sponsored further
meetings, known as JIM I (July 1988) and JIM II (February 1989),26 which
outlined key components of an agreement to be endorsed later at an intema-
tional conference. 27 When, in April of 1989, Vietnam announced its
decision to withdraw its troops by September of that year, the stage was set
for earnest peace negotiations at the Paris Conference on Cambodia.
The involvement of the five permanent members of the Security
Council (the Permanent Five) was critical to the eventual peace settlement.
After the first session of the Paris Conference failed to produce an agree-
ment on power-sharing among the four disputing factions, the Permanent
Five held meetings from January to August of 1990, in which they defined
the fundamental components of a settlement in a "Framework Document. '28
It was only a few days later that the four disputing factions accepted this
document as the basis for settlement.29 The final settlement documents
were signed on October 23, 1991.30
The final settlement, based on the Framework Document, included
new precedents for international law. First, Cambodia became the first
United Nations member-state to be formally administered by a UN body
(the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC). 31
Second, this unique surrender of state sovereignty was arranged by the
24 See Ratner, supra note 16. at4.
25 Cambodia's hereditary king.
26 Jakarta Informal Meeting, convened by the government of Indonesia and including all four
Cambodian disputant factions, Cambodia's two Indochinese neighbors, and the six states of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is composed of Brunei. Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (with Papua New Guinea having formal observer status). See
Ratner, supra note 16, at 4-5.
27 See id, at 5.
28 See generally id, at 5-7.
29 Steven Erlanger, Ending Talks, All Cambodia Parties Commit Themselves to U.N. Peace, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1990, at A3. Final negotiations leading to settlement were delayed until the summer of
1991 due to United Nations preoccupation with the Persian Gulf crisis. Ratner, supra note 16. at 7.
30 See Ratner, supra note 16, at 8.
31 The word 'administered' is politically important in this context. The Cambodian factions could
not agree to any arrangement of coalition government. A U.N. 'government', i.e. a U.N. trusteeship of a
member state, is not permissible under Article 78 of the U.N. Charter. The political compromise
established a coalition governing body, the Supreme National Council, which immediately granted all
governmental authority to the U.N. until free elections were held. See Ratner, supra note 16, at 9.
1994
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Security Council in lieu of approving an enforcement action under Chapter
VII, which would have required a very large troop commitment.32 Since
there was no single recognized government to grant consent to the United
Nations to administer elections, a proxy organization, the Supreme National
Council (SNC), was created out of the four disputing factions.33 The SNC
was not considered the government of Cambodia during the transition. It
only existed (through its recognition by the Security Council)34 as a vehicle
for granting state consent to delegate governing powers to UNTAC.35
Even though the Security Council did not resort to a Chapter VII en-
forcement action, and the corresponding commitment of troops that would
have been required, UNTAC was one of the largest and most expensive
peacekeeping operations in United Nations history. 36 By the time it com-
pleted its mission in September of 1993, it had cost $1.7 billion and had
included 22,000 civilian and military personnel. Even with this massive
influx of resources (in a country whose per capita GNP is only $200/year) 37
the mission did not restore peace. Khmer Rouge threats and PRK intimida-
tion marred the presidential election which followed the UNTAC mission.38
Ultimately, the courage of the Cambodian people was the most critical fac-
tor determining the success of the mission.39
The impotence of the international community's response to the
Cambodian holocaust illustrates the extent to which the Cold War balance
of power on the Security Council prevented collective action by the United
Nations. The inaction of the United Nations caused many international
scholars and politicians to argue that the United Nations should have more
forcible interventionary power to prevent similar atrocities from happening
in the post-Cold War era. Even though the post-Cold War Security Council
now appears capable of collective action to prevent human rights abuse, the
risk of misuse of humanitarian intervention remains.
32 Id. at 9-10.
33 Id. at 10-11.
34 Id at 7, 11 (citing SC Res. 668, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. & Dec. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(19915 Ratner, supra note 16, at I1.
36 William Branigin, Successful U.N. Mission is Completed in Cambodia, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
1993, at A8.
37 POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU. INC.. 1993 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET (1993)
[hereinafter POPULATION REFERENCE].
38 Branigin, supra note 36, at A8.
39 Id. (quoting Yasushi Akashi, head of the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, on the courage of the
Cambodian people being critical for saving the elections).
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The events leading to the Cambodian settlement illustrate how in-
creasing the power of the post-Cold War Security Council may not increase
the security, nor protect the human rights, of the people of Southeast Asia.
Cambodia was a victim of the power politics of the Cold War era.
The United States-supported government (Lon Nol/Khmer Republic) was
replaced by the Chinese-supported government (Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge)
which was replaced by the Soviet Union-supported government (Hun
Sen/Vietnamese-installed PRK). Finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union
and its withdrawal of political and financial support for Vietnam coincided
with the Vietnamese willingness to withdraw from Cambodia in April of
1989.40
This shift in the international and regional balance of power contrib-
uted to a breakthrough in the negotiations. When the Permanent Five united
behind the Framework Document, they were able to get concessions from
the disputing parties. The most important concession from the disputing
Cambodian factions was the establishment of the "strawperson govern-
ment" of the Supreme National Council in order to "grant" Cambodia's
consent to a virtual United Nations transitional government.
What this exercise in power politics portends for Asia is significantly
different than for the rest of the world due to the geopolitical alignment of
China. The balance of power on the Security Council shifted significantly
with the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia has since taken the Soviet
Union's seat on the Security Council. Russia is unlikely to block Western
initiatives on the Security Council as the Soviet Union did in the past.
However, China still may, insofar as its views on human rights have dif-
fered markedly from Western beliefs. 41 China is most likely to exert its
influence in the Asian theater, where its security interests are greatest.
42
Due to the greater likelihood of a Chinese veto, the Security Council is
politically less likely to use an expanding doctrine of humanitarian interven-
40 See Ratner, supra note 16, at 5.
41 See Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, 257 NATION 345 (1993) (noting that China has asserted that
Western beliefs in political and civil rights are not compatible with economic growth). See also Yojana
Sharma. Asia: China MFN Issue a Setback for Human Rights Movement. Inter Press Service, May 20,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwld File (stating, "At the Vienna World Conference on
Human Rights in July last year, Asian countries led by China and Malaysia set great store by the notion
that states had the sovereignty to develop their own concept of human rights and the right not to be inter-
fered with by other nations.").
42 See, e.g., David Pugliese, The Rebels Who Won't Give Up: A Young Ragtag Army Challenges a
Brutal Dictatorship, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 24, 1993, at B5 (noting that China has continued to supply
arms to Myanmar in the face of a nearly universally observed arms embargo intended to pressure
Myanmar's existing government to cease massive human rights abuses).
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tion to address gross violations of human rights in Southeast Asia. The
political stalemate which prevented United Nations action during the 1975-
78 holocaust in Cambodia could happen again, even if the United Nations
were granted greater powers to militarily intervene for humanitarian causes.
Thus, a balance-of-power paralysis similar to that which occurred in the
Cold War era may still prevent United Nations humanitarian intervention in
Southeast Asia.
In addition to the threat of another genocidal episode like that in
Cambodia, other lesser-known atrocities exist which might warrant humani-
tarian intervention. On the tiny island of Bougainville in Papua New
Guinea, over one-fourth of the population has been forced into temporary
shelters by a domestic conflict.43 Abuses by both sides in the conflict in-
clude extra-judidial executions, torture, and rape.44 In Myanmar, the
government was overthrown in a military coup in 1988. The new military
government then refused to accede to an elected government in 1990.45 The
military, in the process of waging a decades-old war against insurgents, has
been reported to be:
43 Kalinga Seneviratne, Papua New Guinea- Human Rights: The Forgotten War; Inter Press Service,
Dec. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwId File.
44 Amnesty International issued a scathing report accusing both the government and rebel troops of
abuses. It cited incidents where government troops tied suspected opponents to a truck and dragged them
along the road before shooting them. Earlier reports by an Australian barrister accused Australia of
attempting to stop independent investigations that allegedly "could reveal its complicity in large-scale
human rights violations," with detailed evidence that "at least 120 innocent civilians had been murdered
without provocation." Australia Accused of Trying to Cover up Massacres, Agence France Presse. July 8,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwid File.
The causes of the conflict are primarily financial and ethnic. The copper-rich island supplied Papua
New Guinea with nearly half its export earnings until critical copper mine installations were blown up by
rebels to protest the fact that local people saw little of the huge profits made by the Australian mine
owners. The people of Bougainville share a common heritage with the nearby Solomon Islands, a mere
row boat ride away. In contrast, Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea, is 560 miles away.
Bougainvillians resent the artificial colonial boundary which has placed them under PNG control since
Australia granted independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975. International response to the plight of
civilians in Bougainville has been slight. Resolutions passed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
which recommended a fact-finding mission be sent to Bougainville, were not implemented as planned. See
Pacific Waves, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 42.
45 Myanmar recently declared itself to be a Southeast Asian nation, although it is west of Thailand
and its only coastline is on the Bay of Bengal next to India. Myanmar Seeks "Meaningful Ties" with
ASEAN, THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 24, 1993, at 12 [hereinafter Meaningful Ties]. The pronouncement
followed by days a U.N. General Assembly resolution which criticized Myanmar for violations of basic
human rights. General Nuynt is the de facto ruler of Myanmar's military dictatorship. Evelyn Leopold,
Assembly Rebukes List of States for Rights Abuses, Reuters, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AlIwId File.
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'purifying' the country by destroying the ethnic groups or
forcing them to flee to neighboring nations . . . and has de-
stroyed villages, conducted a systematic campaign of rape and
torture and used women and children for slave labor.
Thousands have died. Another 300,000 have been forced to
flee to Bangladesh and Thailand.46
In Indonesia,47 approximately one-third of the population of East
Timor (about 200,000 people) have been killed by the Indonesian army in a
prolonged attempt to forcibly assimilate the island.4S In addition, Amnesty
International estimates that 2,000 civilians, including children and the eld-
erly, have been killed by the Indonesian army in Aceh, a heavily Muslim
part of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Some of these deaths have been
arranged as public executions. 49
B. Southeast Asia is Unique with Respect to Humanitarian Intervention
Southeast Asia's unique political, economic, cultural and legal situ-
ation highlights the dilemmas presented by humanitarian intervention. The
region runs a high risk of further human rights abuse -in the future. There
are several reasons for this. First, Southeast Asia is one of the poorest
regions of the world. It has an average per capita income of only $980, only
46 See Pugliese, supra note 42, at B5. A $1.4 billion arms shipment to the Myanmar army from
China may combine with the virtual surrender of one of the largest anti-government forces to guarantee the
surrender or annihilation of the remaining 10,000-member Karen guerrilla army. Id. These guerrillas urge
both intervention and economic and military non-cooperation with Myanmar by the international commu-
nity. While many nations already comply with a voluntary arms embargo, others such as China, North
Korea and Poland continue to provide arms. Myanmar has successfully sealed the country's borders and
international attention is unlikely without international reporting.
47 Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world, stretching over 13,000 islands between
the Asian continent and Australia. Peter S. Goodman, Slavery plain and simple: Reebok, Nike and Levi
Strauss on the Prowl for Cheap Labor in Indonesia, PROGRESSIVE. June. 1993, at 26. Since 1969, it has
been ruled by Suharto, a military general. That year. Suharto's military ousted Sukamo (the charismatic
leader who led Indonesia's bid for independence from colonial rule) in a bloody purge in which 500,000
people were killed as suspected communist sympathizers. See After Suharto: Indonesia, ECONOMIST, Dec.
26, 1993, at 43.
Suharto has no clear successor. Unless this changes before he passes away there could be tremendous
conflict associated with competitors' attempts to fill the power vacuum. Id In that environment the mili-
tary could easily repeat the experience of 1969, in which event humanitarian intervention could be a very
controversial issue for the international and Southeast Asian communities.
48 Ani King Underwood, Letterfrom East Timor, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Sept. 3, 1993, at 11.
49 The Javanese Empire. ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1993, at 116.
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23.4 percent of the world average.50 Some fear that massive poverty along-
side the rapidly increasing wealth in Southeast Asian countries will lead to
increased conflict and further human rights abuses.5 1 Furthermore, the
growing importance of the Asian economies in the context of the global
economy may give government elites of this region increased influence in
global affairs and increase their ability to resist outside pressures to improve
human rights performance. 52 The tension between economic concerns and
human rights has already led to controversy over the priority of economic
development over democratic values. 53
Second, there is potential for increased ethnic conflict in Southeast
Asia which could give rise to significant human rights abuse. One of the
defining characteristics of the post-Cold War era is the increase in ethnic
conflict among formerly peaceful neighbors.54 The region is heavily popu-
lated, but often in largely isolated and distinct pockets. Dense population
and geographic barriers have produced a vast array of linguistically and
ethnically distinct peoples throughout the region.55
Third, Southeast Asia is extremely diverse culturally and religiously.
Although many Southeast Asian nations are primarily Buddhist, Indonesia
has the largest Muslim population in the world, while the Philippines are 97
percent Christian (mostly Catholic). 56
Human rights abuses are less likely to be corrected, or even identi-
fied, at the regional level in Southeast Asia. In contrast to every other major
50 POPULATION REFERENCE. supra note 37.
51 See Peter Wallensteen. Global Patterns of Conflict and the Role of Third Parties, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1992).
52 See Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard (Human Rights), FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1993, at
24. See also Sharma, supra note 41 ("[T]he determination of Asian governments not to succumb to U.S.
'bully-boy' tactics, has led to a chorus of warnings t6 Washington not to impose its values on China and
the rest of Asia, whatever these values may be. The whole episode [Washington's threat to withhold Most
Favored Nation status from China] has given a new credibility to the unholy alliance in Asia of govem-
ments who reject human rights as a 'Western concept', say activists, adding that there has been a serious
setback to the universality of rights.").
53 See Max L. Stackhouse, The Future of Human Rights (World Conference on Human Rights), 110
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 661 (1993) (noting that Singapore and Malaysia framed the issue as development vs.
democracy at the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June of 1993). See also Neier,
supra note 41, at 345 (noting that authoritarian East Asian nations, such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia
and China, have asserted that Western beliefs in political and civil rights are not compatible with economic
growth). See also R.K.L. Panjabi, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 199 (1992)
(book review).
54 See generally The New Tribalism, supra note II.
55 See Panjabi, supra note 53. at 200.
56 See generally Virginia Leary, Human Rights in the Asian Contest: Prospects for Regional Human
Rights Instruments, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 319, 321.
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region, neither Southeast Asia nor Asia as a whole has a regional human
rights system.5 7 Southeast Asia does not have an intergovernmental organi-
zation with mandated responsibility to define, interpret, monitor or enforce
human rights norms.5 8 Other continents are at least partially covered by
Regional Arrangements established under the authority of Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter or by regional human rights regimes.5 9 Thus, humanitarian
intervention is more likely to be considered by the United Nations as a
necessary response to human rights abuse in Southeast Asia than in other
areas of the world.
Southeast Asia has neither its own normative standards nor has the
region acceded to the most widely accepted global human rights norms.
The lack of a regional agreement on human rights would not be so grievous
if Southeast Asian nations were already parties to other international rights
treaties. Only the Philippines and.Vietnam are signatories to the two major
binding human rights conventions.
60
Since very few Southeast Asian states are bound by the international
human rights treaties, the absence of a Southeast Asian human rights regime
leaves the region with no adjudicative or enforcement mechanism to de-
termine and sanction human rights violations. Violations are thus more
likely to be severe before remedial action is deemed to be appropriate. In
such cases, severe sanctions are more likely to be seen as necessary.
Further, without a regional system, violations must be remedied by either
unilateral state action (such as occurred in the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia) or action under the United Nations. Both of these options have
disadvantages (which are explored below in Part IV.A.).
Finally, it is unlikely that the Security Council will militarily impose
human rights norms onto Southeast Asian countries without engendering
philosophical, as well as political, resistance from China. As the only one
of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council which is not
European or Euro-centric, China does not share the philosophical founda-
tions of many international human rights norms which have emerged from
57 Panjabi, supra note 53, at 200; see also Leary, supra, note 56, at 321.
58 Leary, supra note 56, at 321. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is an
economic organization founded in 1967 to support Southeast Asian economic and cultural cooperation.
EDMUND J. OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 54
(19851 See generally Leary, supra note 56, at 320.
60 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Leary, supra note 56, at 327 n.7. See also Kausikan, supra
note 52, at 24.
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European traditions. Thus, China may be expected to play a critical role
vis-A-vis humanitarian intervention by the UN in Southeast Asia.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A RESPONSE TO
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
Given that Southeast Asia lacks effective regional remedies for an
existing, and possibly increasing, problem of human rights abuse, should
humanitarian intervention by UN forces be an allowable remedy under in-
ternational law? Historically, states have often sought to justify forcible
humanitarian intervention on unilateral legal or moral grounds.61 However,
unilateral humanitarian intervention has been widely considered illegal un-
der the UN Charter. This Section first examines the historical evolution of
humanitarian intervention up to the end of the Cold War and then identifies
the trends that have emerged in the post-Cold War period.
A. Historical Background
Historical analysis of humanitarian intervention can be divided into
three periods prior to the end of the Cold War:
I. Customary Law (prior to the Kellogg-Briand Pact);
2. Pre-UN Charter (between the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929
and the signing of the UN Charter in 1945); and
3, UN Charter (after the founding of the United Nations). 62
1. Customary Law
Although some scholars suggest that the concept of humanitarian in-
tervention predates Grotius,63 most scholars focus on the development of
61 See Scheffer, supra note 6, at 254 n.4 (for a historical listing of international interventions justi-
fied or criticized on humanitarian grounds since the early 1800s; organized by category).
62 See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 16 (statements by Richard R.
Baxter and Richard A. Falk, prior to the end of the Cold War, on the three distinct periods in the evolution
of humanitarian intervention); see also Jean Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect
Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N.,
supra note 2, at 197; see also JOSEPH MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF
INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 7-12 (1982).
63 Hugo Grotius is an important and early theoretical architect of modem international law who de-
veloped a basic theory of law and order for inter-state relations in 1625. See MARK W. JANIS, AN
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the doctrine during and since the nineteenth century.64 During the 19th
century there were many instances of unilateral military intervention by
powerful nations against weaker nations. 65 Before the Kellogg-Briand
Pact66 there was no formal, universal international law proscribing the use
of military force. 67 During this period, international law was defined pri-
marily by customary law, which is especially susceptible to subjective and
differing interpretations. 68 The malleability of the doctrine allowed it to be
defined either to legitimate or proscribe intervention.69 Thus, humanitarian
intervention was defined and used according to the needs of the powerful
nations.70
2. Pre-UN Charter
The Kellogg-Briand Pact is viewed as a turning point in international
law because it established a general prohibition on the use of war, including
interventionary wars. Formally known as the Treaty Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,7 ' the Pact's gen-
eral prohibition on war proved ineffective, in as much as it lacked any
mechanisms for interpretation or enforcement. Subsequent debate over its
interpretation has focused on which exceptions to the general prohibition on
war, if any, would be allowed.72 Before the United Nations was formed
many legal scholars continued to assert that the doctrine of humanitarian
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-81 (2d ed. 1993). See also HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 23-24 (quoting Professor W. Michael Reisman).
64 See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 23 (quoting a statement by
Professor Frey-Wouters).
65 See Scheffer, supra note 6, at 254-56.
66 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy, August 27,
1928,46 Stat. 2343. T.S. No. 796,2 Bevans 732, L.N.T.S. 57.
67 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 14 (quoting Richard R. Baxter).
68 See I. BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-12 (3d. ed. 1979); see also
JANIS, supra note 63, at 53 (Noting the particular weaknesses of customary law, that "[clustomary interna-
tional law is ordinarily found by a more or less subjective weighing of the evidence, and subjective scales
tilt differently in different hands.").
69 See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 15.
70 Id
71 See Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy, supra note
66.
72 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM, 22-24 (1994).
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intervention survived the Kellogg-Briand Pact as an allowable exception
based in customary law.7 3
3. UN Charter
In contrast, the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 has been under-
stood to eradicate the customary law doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Article 2(4)74 prohibits any threat or use of force between States, except for
self-defense from armed attack which is allowed under Article 51. 75 The
United Nations can only use interventionary force in enforcement actions
under Chapter VII. In addition, Article 2(7), which prohibits the United
Nations from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any State, has been seen as equally applicable to relations
between States.76 Thus, with the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there was
wide agreement that the prohibitions on force and intervention would com-
bine with international law principles of sovereign equality and political
independence to preclude forcible humanitarian intervention. 77
73 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2, at 16-17 (quoting Richard R. Baxter
and Richard A. Falk).
74 Article 2(4) reads, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
75 Article 51 states, in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 5 I.
76 Article 2 states, in part:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7; see also Fonteyne in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N.. supra note
62, at 200.
77 See Fonteyne in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 62, at 200; see also
Sohail H. Hashmi, Is There an Islamic Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention, 7 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 55, 56-
57 (quoting Michael Akehurst "that the U.N.'s 1979 condemnation of Vietnam's unilateral incursion into
Pol Pot's Cambodia reflected 'a consensus among states in favor of treating humanitarian intervention as
illegal.').
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It was only a few years after the Charter was created, however, that
these strict interpretations began to be tested. With the escalation of the
Cold War came the miscarriage of the collective security mechanism upon
which the United Nations was premised. 78 The failure of the United
Nations to live up to its founders' original vision became a controversial
justification for reviving a "right" of unilateral humanitarian intervention
either as a form of customary law outside the Charter,79 or-within a broader
interpretation of the Charter.80
The failure of Article 43 necessitated the advent of United Nations
peacekeeping forces.81 Peacekeeping was not mentioned in the UN Charter;
rather, it evolved as an ad-hoc concept.82 Essentially, it may be defined as
United Nations military action in a sovereign state for the purpose of main-
,taining or restoring peace.83  Peacekeeping developed primarily as a
78 The advent of the Cold War led to both superpowers using the veto power to prevent effective use
of the United Nations enforcement machinery in all but a few cases. See JOSEPH MURPHY, supra note 62,
at21.
79 Compare Richard B. Lillich. Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.
REV. 325 (1967) and Richard B. Lillich. Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205 (1969)
(arguing that unilateral forcible humanitarian intervention to protect human rights is legal) with Ian
Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John N.
Moore ed., 1974) (arguing that the Charter precludes, and/or has become, the relevant customary norm;
that it clearly prohibits forcible humanitarian intervention; and that the customary norm immediately pre-
ceding adoption of the Charter, if it were deemed to survive as an adjunct to the Charter, would also
prohibit humanitarian intervention). See also Richard B. Lillich. Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to
Ian Brownile and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
229 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter Reply to Brownlie] (arguing that humanitarian intervention is
not prohibited by the Charter, is allowed under customary law and is necessary due to the abject inability of
the United Nations to take effective action to terminate the genocidal conduct and alleviate the mass suffer-
ing in Bangladesh [requiring] a fundamental reassessment ... of the role of self-help, and especially of
humanitarian intervention, in international affairs today).
80 See Fonteyne in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 62, at 200; R. George
Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 435, 439 n.28 (citing
scholars who use a type of "frustration of purpose" argument to allow exceptions to Article 2(4) and 2(7));
see also Reply to Brownlie, supra note 79, at 236 (arguing that 2(4) only prohibits use of force which
affects the "territorial integrity" or "political independence" of the target state, or is inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations, none of which, according to these authors, apply to humanitarian interven-
tion).
81 See Rosalyn Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-keeping, in UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS 1-3 (A. Cassese ed., 1978).
82 See Dan Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-keeping Operations, in
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS 15 (A. Cassese ed., 1978); MURPHY, supra note 62, at
21-22.
83 See I ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY at ix (1969) [hereinafter PEACEKEEPING]. Higgins examines several definitions from "the
entire role of the United Nations in maintaining, or restoring, international peace" to "United Nations
forces ... which are operational on a territory with the consent of its government." Higgins uses a generic
definition: "operations in which personnel owing allegiance to the United Nations are engaged in military
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mechanism for the United Nations to maintain truces already established by
diplomacy, not as a form of intervention to enforce human rights norms. 84
The definitional distinctions between maintaining peace and preserv-
ing fundamental norms of human rights on the one hand, and between
Chapter VII enforcement actions and peacekeeping on the other, proved
problematic from the very beginning. For example, the Korean War, one of
the first Chapter VII actions undertaken by the United Nations, is also re-
ferred to as a peacekeeping operation.85 North Korea's refusal to allow re-
unification and elections was followed by its invasion of South Korea.86
Thus, an "act of aggression" triggering Chapter VII also involved the fun-
damental human rights issue of self-determination.87
While distinguishing between United Nations "enforcement" and
peacekeeping has been difficult,88 maintaining the distinction between
United Nations military intervention authorized under Chapter VII to
maintain peace and United Nations intervention to promote human rights
has been more substantive and controversial.8 9 These distinctions have
proven to be increasingly unworkable in the post-Cold War period.
or para-military duties ... designated by the United Nations as necessary for the maintenance or restoration
of peace."
84 See MURPHY, supra note 62, at 21-22, 79-93.
85 In the Korean War the U.N. Security Council authorized the multilateral military effort (led by the
U.S.) only because the Soviet Union's delegate was absent from the Council when the North Koreans
invaded South Korea. The critical authorization resolution was S.C. Res. 83. Subsequent vetoes by the
Soviet Union led to the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the General Assembly, which provided the de
facto legitimacy for continued United Nations action. See MURPHY, supra note 62, at 29-37. See also
ARTHUR M. COX, PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING 6 (1967); Paul Lewis, Painting Nations Blue, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at A17.
86 See MURPHY, supra note 62, at 29.
87 See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power. 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 16 (citing Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, Article
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments for the internationally recog-
nized right of peoples to self-determination).
88 See Ciobanu, supra note 82, at 15-29.
89 Perhaps this is most especially true with self-determination issues. See generally, Nafziger, supra
note 87, at 9. See also Russell Watson, Perils of Peacekeeping, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 34; Paul
Lewis, U.N. 's Top Troop Official Sees No Need for War Room, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 27. 1992, §1, at A12
(hereinafter War Room] ("As peacekeeping grows, its nature is changing, with United Nations operations
becoming increasingly complex and intrusive and moving toward what Mr. Goulding [Marrack Goulding,
Under Secretary General in charge of United Nations Peacekeeping] called 'the gray area between classic
peacekeeping and enforcement'.").
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B. Trends of the Post-Cold War Period
There have been significant changes in the nature of humanitarian
intervention in the post-Cold War era. As the Cold War has thawed, the
United Nations has dramatically increased its peacekeeping missions. Since
1988, the United Nations has initiated fourteen new peacekeeping opera-
tions, more than in the previous forty years. Thirteen of these operations
were still under way in early 1993, with over 50,000 United Nations troops
wearing the "blue helmets" at a cost of roughly $3 billion a year.90 In
addition, there have been three significant qualitative developments in
humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War which together
constitute a trend toward allowing forcible humanitarian intervention.
These developments have been with respect to: 1) the legal bases for
humanitarian interventions; 2) who is or should be intervening; and 3) how
the interventions are being conducted.
1. Legal Bases for Humanitarian Intervention
"Threat to the peace" and "consent," the two legal bases which allow
forcible intervention by the United Nations, have been greatly expanded in
recent years. Under the UN Charter the Security Council has been pre-
cluded by Article 2(7) from militarily intervening to address domestic
human rights violations.9 1 Internal conflicts have been seen as "matters es-
sentially [in] the domestic jurisdiction" of each nation state unless they pose
a "threat to the peace" under Article 39, thereby allowing Chapter VII
intervention.92 This narrow interpretation of a right of humanitarian inter-
vention by the United Nations has been debated,93 and has tended to be sup-
90 See War Room, supra note 89, at A12.
91 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
92 See Mary Ellen O'Connell , Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903,
904-905; Fonteyne, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N.. supra note 62, at 199-200; Ian
Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 235 (1961). See generally JANIS,
supra note 63, at 180. But cf ROBERTA COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES: NEW
ROLES FOR U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 3 (1992) (asserting that the last 30 years of U.N. work in the
human rights field has established that "human rights violations are seen as a legitimate concern for the
international community and a legitimate basis for international action.").
93 See Fonteyne in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 62, at 203-209
(identifying the various strands of debate on the issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention
by the United Nations or unilaterally by single nations as possible exceptions to the Article 2(7) prohibition
on intervention. Fonteyne notes that most representatives held States to the same strict restraint as the
United Nations, thereby precluding any intervention in matters which were essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State. A "large" number precluded unilateral intervention for any reason, while an
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ported by militarily weaker countries afraid of being the victims of misuse
through a broader interpretation. 94 The only other way that foreign states or
the United Nations have been able to legally intervene has been with the
consent of the target state.95 Thus, United Nations interpretations of both
"consent" and "threat to the peace" have undergone dramatic changes to-
wards allowing humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War period.
a. "Threat to the Peace"
Recently, the United Nations has explicitly and effectively expanded
its interpretation of "threat to the peace" to include humanitarian concerns.
The first meeting of the Security Council ever to be held at the level of
Heads of State and Government adopted the Summit Declaration of January
31, 1992:
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States
does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The
non-military sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to
peace and security.96
United Nations practice has so far matched its rhetoric. With
Resolution 688 the Security Council authorized humanitarian assistance and
military protection for the Kurds within Iraqi borders.97 This military ac-
"impressive" number held that the nonintervention principle was not applicable, whether by the United
Nations or unilaterally, to human rights and self-determination cases.).
94 Id; see also Paul Lewis, Disaster Relief Proposal Worries Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1991, at A9.
95 See JANIS, supra note 63, at 180-81 (noting that the mechanism of "consent" was used by the
superpowers during the Cold War to both intervene on behalf of governments and insurgents they favored
under different versions of a consent theory of legitimation). See also Lloyd N. Cutler, The Right to
Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFl. 96, 108 (1985) and Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic
Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984). There also exist troublesome justifications for intervention under
a state's right of self-defense, currently articulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. However,
this does not apply to the United Nations because it is not a "state."
96 U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992), at 3. But cf United Nations Security Council Summit Opening
Addresses by Members, Fed. News Serv., Jan. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwId File
(showing that there remain strong voices to limit authority for Security Council action within national
boundaries).
97 See generally Philip Alston, The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learnedfrom
the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and its Aftermath, AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 108; Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at
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tion to protect a persecuted minority within the territorial boundaries of a
nation-state was unprecedented. 98 Thus, an expanded interpretation of what
constitutes a "threat to the peace" 99 appears to be enlarging the legal basis
for humanitarian intervention by the post-Cold War United Nations.100
b. "Consent"
In the last few years, consent of the host state has been eroding as a
limitation on decisions by the United Nations to intervene with peacekeep-
ing forces. During the Cold War, UN policy was to secure the consent of a
target state (and usually all warring parties) before placing United Nations
peacekeeping troops in the midst of a hot conflict.101 For example, the
United Nations peacekeeping action in the Congo in 1964 was initiated with
the consent of the Congolese government. In Cambodia and Somalia, the
post-Cold War United Nations devised creative means to manufacture or
bypass this consent requirement. In Cambodia, a fictitious government was
created to grant consent. As discussed above in Section II.A, several war-
ring factions all claimed to be the legitimate government of Cambodia. The
Permanent Five member states of the Security Council obtained the agree-
ment of these four factions to establish a "strawperson" government, the
Supreme National Council (SNC). 102 The sole purpose of the SNC was to
grant consent to the United Nations to establish the massive peacekeeping
Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations. 67 IND. L.J. 887; O'Connell. supra
note 92 (discussing at length the history and ramifications of the Iraqi/Kurdish crisis and the United
Nations responses).
98 Some analysts argue that it should not be viewed as a precedent for forcible humanitarian inter-
vention, but as merely an extension of the authority granted U.N. sponsored forces for the Gulf War or in
response to the mass exodus of refugees. Contra Alston, supra note 97, at 158.
99 Previously the United Nations has interpreted human rights violations to be "threats" twice. First,
with economic sanctions against the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Second, with
sanctions directed at the apartheid regime of South Africa. These actions raised significant controversy
over the interpretation of Article 39. See MURPHY, supra note 62, at 139-146; S.C. Res. 217 (1965) and
S.C. Res. 352 (1968).
100 This is precisely the interpretive strategy advocated by nearly all who want a broader power of
humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Delbruck, supra note 97, at 899-901 ("This view deserves support.");
Scheffer, supra note 6, at 286-288 (arguing for even broader authority than might be allowed under a
broader interpretation of "threat to the peace"). But cf O'Connell supra note 92, at 911 (arguing against
an expansive interpretation of "threat to the peace" as regards United Nations intervention in civil wars).
01 Antonieta Di Blase, The Role of the Host State's Consent with Regard to Non-Coercive Actions
by the United Nations, in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS 55 (A. Cassese ed., 1978).
102 Ratner, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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force of UNTAC (the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia).103
The United Nations bypassed consent of the host state or the parties
in conflict for the first time in Somalia.104 The Security Council justified
this action by claiming that there was no government in Somalia, because
the country was in a civil war between several warlord factions.105 But the
United Nations has received consent before placing peacekeepers in other
countries ravaged by internal strife and civil war.106 This occurred as re-
cently as 1992 in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.107 In Somalia, with
the justification that the civil war canceled any presumption of a prevailing
government, the United Nations created a precedent for similar initiatives
with similar circumstances of alleged ambiguity of authority.
2. Who Should Intervene
The international reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait signaled the
dramatic end of the Cold War period and a shift from unilateral to multilat-
eral interventions. 108  The Chapter VII enforcement provisions and
collective security architecture of the United Nations were freed from the
stagnation and inaction created by the balance of power and deep mistrust
between the veto-wielding United States and Soviet Union.109 The Gulf
War signaled that the United Nations had finally acquired the political
capability to enforce international norms related to peace and security."10
Subsequent UN military actions inside Iraq to protect the Kurds also
103 Id at 9- 1.
104 See Eric Schmitt, Most U.S. Troops will Leave Somalia by April in U.N. Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1993, § 1, at4.
105 Id.
106 Ciobanu, supra note 82, at 38-39 ("[Tlhe consent of the parties concerned is the conditio sine
qua non for the stationing, deployment and movement of the United Nations forces carrying out
peacekeeping operations in the territory under their sovereignty or control." Ciobanu later distinguishes
Chapter VII actions as exempted from this fundamental consent requirement.).
107 See, e.g., John F. Bums, Serbian Leader in Croatia Agrees to Cooperate With U.N. Troops, N.Y
TIMES. Feb. 24, 1992, at A3 (reporting that a major obstacle to United Nations troop placement in Croatia
was removed with the consent of a critical Serbian leader).
108 See generally Scheffer, supra note 6, at 263.
109 See Nafziger, supra note 87, at 26-27. For discussion of alternative views see generally
COLLECTIVE SECURITY (Marina S. Finkelstein & Lawrence S. Finkelstein eds., 1966).
110 The issue of unilateral intervention is not dead, however. Differing values and politics forced
newly elected President Clinton to address the option of unilateral intervention in the Bosnian war. See
The Guns Talk Too, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at46.
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highlighted the willingness of the United Nations to use military force to
address violations of international human rights within a sovereign state.II
Although multilateral intervention by the UN seems to better insure
against the misuse of humanitarian intervention, UN decisions on where and
when to intervene are significantly limited by the military inequality of its
member states. The United States has emerged as the dominant force within
the United Nations, particularly on the Security Council.' 12 This shift in the
power dynamics of the Security Council has provided the United States with
a greater opportunity to set the agenda of the United Nations, particularly as
regards Chapter VII enforcement actions.1 13 For those countries which do
not share the policies of the United States, this is a matter of some concern.
Many countries now view United States leadership and influence over the
United Nations with apprehension. 114
3. How Interventions are Conducted
Humanitarian intervention through the United Nations is also becom-
ing more militarized. For example, United Nations responses to the civil
war in the former Yugoslavia have merged traditional peacekeeping with
the more militarily aggressive forms of humanitarian intervention and
Chapter VII enforcement actions. For the first time, the United Nations
authorized its peacekeeping troops to use military force to get relief supplies
to their intended recipients.115 This merger has created a new hybrid that
has been dubbed "humanitarian enforcement" by the media. 116 The New
York Times reported that the United States insisted in late November of
1993, that U.S forces joining the UN forces in Somalia be allowed to use
"all necessary means" including "more aggressive tactics than the force in
I I 1 See Delbruck, supra note 97, at 899. Contra Alston, supra note 97, at 158.
112 See Craig R. Whitney, More Than Ever, UN. Policing is an American Show. N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1993, at E3 ("In those instances where the United Nations was able to act, from Korea to the Persian
Gulf, it always did so with the strong political backing and the military muscle of the United States. Where
the United States did not provide the wherewithal, the United Nations has seldom been effective.").
113 See generally Paul Lewis, U.N. Weighs Terms by U.S. for Sending Somalia Force. N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1992, §1, at 6 [hereinafter UN. Weighs Terms] (noting the great influence the U.S. has in dictat-
ing terms to the United Nations on whether and how to intervene under United Nations auspices).
114 See Paul Lewis, UN. Votes to Send Force to Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 21, 1992, §1, at 3
[hereinafter U.N. Votes to Send Force] ("[T]hird World countries are fighting any move that enlarges the
powers of the Security Council, which they increasingly see as an instrument of American foreign
policy."1).
il5 War Room, supra note 89, at A 12.
116 Id.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina had used so far in its efforts to speed the delivery
of food and medicine."1 17
In addition, the numbers of troops in United Nations peacekeeping
operations have been increasing. The Somalia operation was the largest to
date,,with more than 30,000 United Nations troops at its peak.1iB The UN
forces authorized to go to Cambodia (20,000) and Croatia (14,000) were the
second and third largest ever deployed.l19
In the post-Cold War era, a trend has been developing. This trend is
toward humanitarian interventions executed through the United Nations
rather than unilaterally by individual states. The size, number and military
aggressiveness of UN peacekeeping has increased dramatically. In addition,
the Security Council has been broadening its interpretations of key terms
such as "consent" and "threat to the peace" to provide a legal basis for
aggressive peacekeeping and Chapter VII enforcement actions for humani-
tarian ends.
IV. DILEMMAS OF DEFINITION
i Although humanitarian intervention has a long history as a concept
its definition continues to evolve.120 Recent writers have suggested new
definitions to aid in both clarifying the doctrine and shaping it to further
their particular political ends. 121 Analysis demonstrates that creating new or
refined definitions of allowable humanitarian intervention is not the most
effective way to resolve the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention. There
are two significant disadvantages to the "definitional strategy" of refining
the doctrine of allowable humanitarian intervention to control its misuse.
The first is conceptual and the second is practical.
117 Michael R. Gordon, Somali Aid Plan is Called Most Ambitious Option, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1992, at L6; see also U.N. Weighs Terms, supra note 113.
118 Julia Preston, U.N. Moves Toward New Role in Somalia, WASH. POST. Feb. 5, 1994, at A14.
119 Paul Lewis, UN. Council Favors Peace Force for Yugoslavia N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 13, 1992, at
Al ("The senior official in charge of peacekeeping ... favors a total force of 13,000, the second-largest
ever deployed."); U.N. Votes to SendForce, supra note 114 ("The United Nations Security Council voted
unanimously tonight to start dispatching a 14,000 member peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia .... [T]he
operation in Yugoslavia, which is already one of the biggest the United Nations has ever organized, will be
followed by an even bigger and more complex one next week when the Council is expected to send mili-
tary and civilian contingents to oversee the end of Cambodia's long civil war.").
120 See generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 2.
121 See Scheffer, supra note 6, at 258 nn.6-7 (regarding scholars who advocate narrow and broad
interpretations of allowable humanitarian intervention); Wright. supra note 80, at 436-37.
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A. The Inherently Subjective Nature of Humanitarian Intervention
Due to the subjectivity inherent in the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention, a refined definition of allowable humanitarian intervention can still
function only as a standard like "reasonableness" or "good faith," rather
than as a bright line rule. Thus, even if an exception to the prohibitions on
force and intervention could be defined, its application would be determined
by those interpreting or enforcing that definition.122 Thus, the definition
does not, in itself, provide an adequate safeguard against misuse.
Analysis of key elements of the definition of humanitarian interven-
tion illustrates that they are each inherently vulnerable to subjective
interpretation.
Figure 1: Model Definition of Humanitarian Intervention123
Humanitarian intervention is:
1) intervention
2) by a state or international governmental body
3) in the territory or internal affairs of a sovereign state
4) to prevent human rights abuses or human suffering
5) caused or unalleviated by that sovereign state.
1. Model Definition: "Intervention"
"Intervention" may be defined as "various forms of interference by
one or several states into affairs which are within the jurisdiction of another
state in pursuance of their own interest." 124  Usually, though not
exclusively, interference is executed with military force.125 A norm of non-
122 In contrast to domestic legal systems, international law lacks fully developed institutions of
compulsory adjudication and enforcement.
123 This model definition is drawn from a synthesis of many sources, each of which had a different
definition of humanitarian intervention. See AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 113; Brownlie, supra note
5, at 217; Scheffer, supra note 6, at 264; Wright, supra note 80, at 436.
124 OSMANCZYK, supra note 58, at 418.
125 See generally Fonteyne in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N., supra note 62, at 205
(noting that most comments of United Nations representatives interpreted the Article 2(7) prohibition to
apply equally to forcible or non-forcible intervention by either the United Nations or individual states).
For an interesting analysis of whether customary norms exist which also prohibit non forcible forms of
1994
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intervention thus becomes problematic in an interdependent world. It is
clear that military invasions like that of Vietnam into Cambodia are inter-
ventions into the "territorial integrity" of a target state. But are non-military
forms of inter-state actions, such as economic sanctions, trade wars or
diplomatic statements also intervention? When the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution which criticized Myanmar for violations of basic human
rights, Myanmar Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw told reporters that the UN
resolution was "interference." 126
Perhaps what is really at issue is less the form of influence exerted
than the desired end. The cry of "intervention" may be a way of attempting
to delegitimize an influential act by coloring it with a taboo term.
Intervention may best be defined as an illegitimate form of influence or
interaction; and whether an act is illegitimate is a subjective, political judg-
ment.
2. Model Definition: "In the Territory or Internal Affairs"
Two concepts are significant in analyzing "Territory" and "Internal
Affairs." These concepts are expressed in Article 2(4) (prohibiting use of
force against the "territorial integrity" of any state) and Article 2(7)
(prohibiting United Nations intervention in "matters which are essentially
the domestic jurisdiction of any state").
a. Model definition: "Internal Affairs"
The process of defining what sorts of matters are "essentially [within]
the domestic jurisdiction" of a state invokes a paradigm of categorical
"spheres." Determining what activities are "domestic" and what are
"international" is essentially the same question Chief Justice Marshall tried
to answer in Gibbons v. Ogden, except, in that case, the issue was between
"state" and "federal" spheres. 127 The evolution of the Commerce Clause
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law may be viewed as a prophetic analog to
this categorical distinction in international law.
intervention see Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
Over Domestic Affairs. 83 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1989).
126 See Leopold, supra note 45; see also Meaningful Ties. supra note 45, at 12.
127 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306 (2d ed. 1988).
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In Gibbons, Marshall found the federal sphere to be supreme as re-
gards commerce, encompassing any economic activity which affects more
than one state. 128 While the Court used a different test during the formalist
years from 1887-1937,129 the politics, economics and jurisprudence of the
1930s finally led to the ultimate absorption of the state sphere into the fed-
eral sphere in Wickard v. Filburn.130 In this case, the activity of one farmer
growing his own wheat for consumption at home was found to affect inter-
state commerce by what has come to be termed the "cumulative effect
principle."131
A similar line of reasoning has been advanced in the international
arena by proponents of a broader definition of humanitarian intervention. 132
Their logic is that because abuse of human rights within the geographical
boundaries of one state has an "effect" on other countries (e.g., increasing
the influx of refugees, exciting passions, or threatening regional conflict),
these abuses threaten international peace. By this argument as threats to
international peace, abuses of human rights are de facto within the scope of
Chapter VII and thus extend beyond the "sphere" of "domestic jurisdic-
tion."
The Security Council has, like the court in Wickard, begun to pursue
this logic to extreme lengths through a broadened definition of "threat to the
peace," giving itself authority to control very local events due to their ulti-
mate "cumulative effect" on the international scene.133 Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan commented on this development, noting, "[We] are at the
point of claiming that the larger community has more rights of intervention.
I don't want a proposition that has the UN General Assembly deciding how
we are handling our affairs in Elmira, N.Y."'134
128 TRIBE, supra note 127, at 306.
129 Id at 307-08.
130 Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. I I I (1942). See TRIBE. supra note 127, at 310.
131 TRIBE, supranote 127. at310.
132 See, e.g., Nafziger, supra note 87, at 3 1; see also Scheffer, supra note 6, at 287.
133 See Naftiger, supra note 87, at 27 (finding that S.C. Res. 688 authorizing military intervention
into Iraq to aid the Kurds was a precedent. "The misery of a suppressed population is no longer deemed
'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of a national government. Large scale deprivations of human
rights unquestionably threaten international peace and security; hence, they engage the Security Council's
powers under Chapter VII .... [R]esolution 688 presaged a larger role for humanitarian intervention under
international authority."). But cf Alston, supra note 97, at 108, 158 ("It is apparent from the foregoing
analysis that the Security Council has not in fact succeeded in establishing the key precedent that some
observers have suggested is already in place as a result of the humanitarian action taken in relation to the
Kurds in northern Iraq.").
134 David Binder & Barbara Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, §1, at 14.
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Moynihan thus points out the dilemma of emphasizing ultimate inter-
connectedness to justify ultimate centralized authority, even for the sake of
such worthy causes as peace and justice. Thus, the issue of interconnected-
ness versus definitional "spheres" is itself interconnected to structural issues
of representation and power distribution. To the extent the UN Security
Council is given authority to intervene in the internal affairs of states, it
becomes increasingly important that the Security Council be truly represen-
tative and have structural limitations placed on its increased concentration
of power.
b. Model definition: "Territory"
A second concept at issue within the model definition of humanitar-
ian intervention is that of "territorial integrity." One might think that a
physical boundary would constitute a sufficient definition. However, many
boundaries are still contested. Boundary lines are often indeterminate and
have constantly shifted throughout history. Thus, the integrity of a territory
is sometimes not as unequivocal as its boundary lines on a current map may
appear.
Many recent conflicts have involved territorial issues. For example,
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 was triggered by military
clashes resulting from a long-standing border dispute between the two
countries. 135 Many current trouble spots across the globe are legacies of
arbitrary line-drawing and nation-creating by colonial powers in the last two
centuries.136
3. Model Definition: "Human Rights Abuses"
Defining "human rights" and their violation is a highly subjective and
value-laden exercise. During the first thirty years of the United Nations,
nearly all of its human rights work was devoted to developing universal
human rights standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human
135 See Ratner, supra note 16, at 3.
136 See MuRPHY, supra note 62, at 25-29 (recounting how one of the earliest United Nations
peacekeeping/Chapter VII enforcement actions was over the Palestine/Israel issue, clearly an example of a
border dispute with a colonial legacy that led to an extremely turbulent conflict); see also id at 148 (telling
of the United Nations operation in the Congo, where Belgian colonial rule left political boundaries which
were unacceptable to the people of Katanga, who revolted in civil war soon after the Congolese achieved
formal independence from the Belgians).
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Rights.137 Originally considered to be a sufficient deterrent to human rights
abuse, "universal" definitions of human rights found in human rights decla-
rations and treaties have proven to be ineffective as governments were not
bound by common interpretations. Compliance has been less than optimal,
without some means of adjudication and enforcement.' 38 The prospect of
internationally compelled enforcement by military intervention highlights
the philosophical issues of moral and cultural relativism which underlie the
debates over the definition and interpretation of universal human rights.
An analysis of the concept of "human rights" illustrates its indetermi-
nacy. One source of confusion is that two meanings of "right" are
intermingled in the expression "human right." A noted human rights
scholar, Jack Donnelly, distinguishes between use of the term "right" to
connote what is "right" (a value judgment) and to describe a "right" which
one "holds."'139 A "right" which one "holds" is actually a legally created
power which may be enforced upon others by .means of legal sanctions.
Thus, a legal "right" is a form of power legitimized by the prevailing ethics
embodied in current law. Claims of human rights are thus claims for power
which ultimately aim to achieve the legitimation of legal sanction. In
simple terms, a "human right" is a legally sanctioned. and normatively
approved form of power.
From the foregoing exploration of the Model Definition of
Humanitarian Intervention, one can see that defining "human rights" must
ultimately, face the challenge of moral relativism.140 Who has authority,
and on what basis, to claim that one ethic or another is to be enforced by
threat or use of force? Some scholars implicitly respond with proposals to
limit humanitarian intervention only to "extreme" or "serious human rights
violations."'14 1 At best this only shifts the argument to defining "extreme" or
"serious." Other scholars point to Treaties, or international declarations like
the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, as expressions of a universal
norm. Yet in the Southeast Asian context, resorting to treaty definitions is
137 COHEN, supra note 92, at 3.
138 Id.
139 JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-10 (1985). Cf BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1323-25 (6th ed. 1990) ("as a noun.... a power... residing in one man of controlling, with
the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of others") ("as an adjective, the term 'right' means just,
morally correct, consonant with ethical principtes.").
140 FERNANDO R. TFSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
22, 3142 (1988). Teson discusses moral relativism and pluralism at length, arguing that philosophical
counter-arguments prevail over this challenge.
141 See, e.g., id at 22.
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problematic insofar as most Southeast Asian states have not acceded to the
primary international human rights conventions. 142 Further, even within
treaties, there is room for different interpretations of key phrases, such as
"genocide," "cruel and inhuman," "torture" or "equal."
B. Practical Disadvantages to Defining Allowable Humanitarian
Intervention
There are practical reasons why attempting to establish specific de-
finitional criteria for distinguishing justified from unjustified humanitarian
intervention is problematic. Treaty elements drafted with what might be
sufficient specificity are likely to be problematic politically. General crite-
ria are usually more politically viable because they can be interpreted in
many ways. But flexible interpretation allows misuse, thereby supporting
those who argue for an unequivocal prohibition. 143 In addition, the diverse
types of situations that would need to be covered would be difficult to ad-
dress with specific criteria. Although many scholars advocate re-defining
the basis for, and definition of, legitimate humanitarian intervention, the
analysis above suggests that definitional approaches alone are insufficient to
prevent misuse of doctrines of humanitarian intervention.
V. DILEMMAS OF DESIGN
Strategies involving the design of new international institutional
structures and processes may be more effective than refined definitions of
doctrine in controlling the worst and augmenting the best of humanitarian
intervention. There are two aspects of institutional design in international
law which hold greater promise in this regard.144 The first pertains to the
question of who should be authorized to make the ultimately subjective,
political judgment to intervene for humanitarian purposes in Southeast Asia.
The second aspect relates to developing means by which the international
142 As of January I, 1994. Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines had ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. IN FORCE AS OF JAN.
1, 1994 350 (1994). As of 1990, only Vietnam and the Philippines had ratified the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 180.25-
180.26 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1990). The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has
been ratified by Laos, Papua-New Guinea, and China. See Leary, supra note 56, at 327 n.7.
143 See, e.g., Alston, supra note 97, at 170-71.
144 Institution is used here in its broader societal sense.
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community might intervene in or influence the affairs of Southeast Asian
states without resort to military force. These approaches to legal design
assume that some form of intervention for humanitarian ends is not only
allowable, but inevitable in an interdependent world.
A. Who Should Have Authorization to Engage in Humanitarian
Intervention in Southeast Asia?
If decisions regarding which circumstances justify humanitarian in-
tervention are inherently subjective and political, then decisions regarding
who determines, interprets and enforces human rights norms become para-
mount. The determination of who makes these ultimately political
decisions is a matter of the structural design of international law. Although
customary law emphasizes independent freedom of action by sovereign
states within their own territory, 45 there is growing recognition of the limits
of this tradition in the post-Cold War era. 146 Thus, a fresh examination of a
few alternative designs is historically opportune, especially with respect to
Southeast Asia and its unique situation (discussed above at Part II.A).
Should decisions to intervene for allegedly humanitarian reasons be made
unilaterally, globally or regionally?
Unilateral humanitarian intervention is highly susceptible to misuse
for political purposes. Every treaty is subject to various interpretations, and
this is especially true when dealing with fluid concepts such as human rights
and intervention. Thus, allowing unilateral interpretation and enforcement
of human rights treaties fosters international conflict. For this reason uni-
lateral humanitarian intervention has enjoyed less support than operations
under the United Nations or regional. arrangements. Unilateral
"enforcement" of a human rights norm by one state against another state has
neither neutrality nor international or regional consensuality to give it the
legitimacy to counter suspicions of self-interested action by individual
states.
There are two collective action alternatives to unilateral action: 1)
global multilateral action through the United Nations, with specific authori-
zation of the Security Council; and 2) regional multilateral action through
145 See generally JANIS, supra note 63, at 153-55.
146 See Elaine Sciolino, Reluctant Heroes: Getting In is the Easy Part of the Mission, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, §4, at 1 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as stating in his Agenda for
Peace that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty [has passed]. It's theory was never matched by
reality.").
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regional constitutive human rights regimes. Although action by the
Security Council would appear more plausible in the post-Cold War era, the
Security Council favors the interests of the most powerful nations. In con-
trast, the development of regional human rights norms and enforcement
mechanisms in Southeast Asia would provide greater promise for resolving
the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention for the region.
1. Collective Human Rights Enforcement Through the United Nations
In the post-Cold War era, great hopes have been raised that the United
Nations may provide relief for victims of human rights abuse around the
globe. Not only is the United Nations incapable of meeting such a daunting
need, it is doubtful that it can impartially select which situations to ad-
dress. 147 Under the UN Charter the Security Council is given "primary
responsibility" for both interpretation and enforcement decisions regarding
international peace and security 48 (and thus for humanitarian intervention,
under the current trend of a broader interpretation of "threat to the peace").
But the Security Council is not representative nor is it neutral. 149 The
Security Council approach has the fundamental flaw of legitimizing a
"Might Makes Right" paradigm. As long as this structure remains, each
permanent member has extraordinary power to block humanitarian inter-
vention by the United Nations. This reduces the political, if not the moral
or legal, legitimacy of humanitarian intervention by the United Nations.150
Proposals have been made to restructure the United Nations and the
Security Council in the post-Cold War era. Germany has requested a per-
manent seat on the Security Council.' 5 ' Secretary General Boutros-Ghali
147 See generally War Room, supra note 89, at Al2.
148 See MURPHY, supra note 62, at 79.
149 Of the 15 member states sitting on the security Council, ten are rotated and five are permanent.
Each of the five permanent members have power to veto any decision. The "Permanent Five", as they are
called, are the United States. Great Britain, France, Russia and China. The United Nations General
Assembly also has a limited claim to representational legitimacy due to the gross disproportionality of its
representational structure. China's 1,18 billion people are entitled to a single representative; so too are
dozens of smaller countries with 100-200,000 citizens. Thus, when the General Assembly passes a resolu-
tion by majority vote, it may or may not reflect the opinions or values of a popular majority of the world's
people. See generally JANis, supra note 63, at 197-98.
150 See, e.g., Murray Kempton, China's Missing on U.N. Blacklist, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 1993, at 37
(noting that the General Assembly's longest ever listing of states who have violated human rights has omit-
ted China, "a significant omission, and its absence affirms a United Nations tradition of seldom reproving a
despotism powerful enough to avenge the affront with its Security Council veto").
151 See generally Craig R. Whitney, UN. Chief Asks Bonn for Troops, Underlining Constitutional
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al (quoting a German official as stating that Germany will not press
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has indicated that there may be a permanent position for Japan on the
Security Council.152 Secretary of State Warren Christopher has also sug-
gested restructuring the permanent membership of the Security Council. 153
But such developments alone would only continue the tradition of giving
greater power to those states already having the greatest power.154 As the
graph below illustrates, the permanent membership of the Security
Council already disproportionately represents much wealthier nations.
Adding Germany and Japan would only exacerbate this problem.
Figure 2: Comparative Wealth of the Current and Proposed Permanent
Membership of the Security Council with the Nations of Southeast Asia
155
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its claim for a permanent seat on the Security Council; while Boutros-Ghali courted their help by stating,
"After all, you are the third most important country in the world. We need the full participation of
Germany in peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcing... if we want a strong United Nations.").
152 See T.R. Reid. UN. Secretary General Calls for 'More Participation' in Peace-keeping
Missions, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A28 (stating that "Boutros-Ghali was fairly encouraging in dis-
cussing Japan's chances of achieving its goal of a permanent seat on the Security Council. As the world's
second-richest country... Japan contends that it has as much right to a permanent seat as the five current
members, which each received its seat four decades ago.").
153 See Watson, supra note 89, at 34 ("[T]he United Nations probably needs to be reinvented, or at
least overhauled - a task that is already being contemplated by the Clinton administration."); see also
Hugo Young, Europe to Clinton: A Wary Welcome, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1993, at 36 ("Warren
Christopher, in his first address to State Department staff, casually remarked that it made sense to review
the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council .... ").
154 The average per capita GNP for all five countries on the Security Council is $12,518.74.
(China's is only $370). If one were to add Japan ($26,920) and Germany ($23,650) to the Security
Council, the average would then be $16,166. Compare this to the median per capita GNP of $980 of the 10
Southeast Asian countries (not including Papua New Guinea, which has a per capita GNP of $820), and
one can better appreciate the gravity of the economic disparity. See POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note
37.
155 See POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 37 (data depicted is deduced by the author from data
provided).
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The concept of a world order in which the United Nations represents
a "community of power" remains unrealized in the face of this "concentra-
tion of power."l5 6 Other proposals supported by Southeast Asian nations
include limiting the veto power of the Permanent Five and adding more
southern hemisphere or non-aligned nations to the Security Council
membership. 5 7 However, efforts to limit the power of the Permanent Five
must be approved by the Permanent Five, thus making significant changes
less likely.' 5 8 Before collective humanitarian intervention by the Security
Council would truly represent a global decision, the Security Council must
become more representative.15 9 Until then, Southeast Asian states have
reason to be suspicious of decisions by the Security Council to intervene in
their affairs for allegedly humanitarian reasons. 160
2. Collective Human Rights Enforcement Through a Regional
Organization or Convention
Development of a regional human rights regime would provide a
more effective alternative for Southeast Asia than current proposals for
restructuring global institutions. 161 Southeast Asia faces a unique set of
circumstances and thus requires a distinct approach to resolving the dilem-
mas of humanitarian intervention in the region. With China holding a veto
power on the Security Council, the United Nations is unlikely to intervene
in Southeast Asia to remedy human rights abuses. Although a regional
regime could not authorize humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter
without authorization from the Security Council,162 it could help prevent
human rights abuses from becoming egregious in the first place. In addi-
156 See Nafziger, supra note 87, at 9-11.
157 See Kissinger Backs Suharto on Restructuring UN. Security Council. Agence France Presse,
Oct. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwId File; Thailand Backs More Members for U.N.
Security Council, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, March 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allwid File; Manila Urges Renewal of U.N. Power Structure. Xinhua General Overseas News
Service, Oct. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwld File.
158 See Yuli Ismartono, Non-Aligned Summit: Calls for U.N. Reform Face Obstacles, Inter Press
Service, Sept. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AllwId File.
159 See generally Alston, supra note 97, at 174.
160 See, e.g., Kissinger Backs Suharto, supra note 157 (reporting that even former U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger "acknowledged that to smaller countries the Security Council might look more and
more like an instrument of the major powers..." in supporting Indonesian President Suharto's call to add
developing nations).
161 See Leary, supra note 56, at 323 (arguing that despite tremendous efforts by the United Nations
and its agencies, the "most effective human rights implementation systems are regional systems").
162 U.N. CHARTERart 53, 1.
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tion, to the extent that the regime contains adjudicative or reporting
functions it could make determinations that certain acts were, by Southeast
Asian standards, judged to be gross violations of human rights. These
determinations would, in turn, provide a focus point for international atten-
tion and, ultimately, enforcement sanctions.
A regional human rights regime would allow Southeast Asian nations
the forum to define human rights norms that, in the words of Zahir Ismail,
the president of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation, "emulate
universal human rights principles but [are] tailored to the needs and
requirements of our society."'163 Many Southeast Asian governments are
challenging the application of what they perceive to be a Western concept
of universal human rights to Southeast Asia. 164 At the Vienna World
Conference on Human Rights last year, China was joined by Southeast
Asian nations in resisting universal human rights norms by claiming the
authority to develop their own concept of human rights.165 However, other
Southeast Asian leaders concur with the Western emphasis on a broader
conception of universal human rights. 166 Devel6pment of a human rights
regime would necessitate the reconciliation of these views in defining
human rights norms which reflect Southeast Asian values. However,
declaring human rights norms will still be insufficient to ensure compliance
with those norms. The problems of subjective interpretation and lack of
enforcement authority will remain. Thus, Southeast Asia should move
beyond declarations and toward designing a Southeast Asian regime to
promote and protect human rights.
Southeast Asia should develop a constitutive convention with adjudi-
cative and enforcement mechanisms similar to the European, American and
African human rights conventions/regimes. These conventions establish
permanent bodies with powers to perform many important functions,
including investigating complaints, facilitating resolution of disputes, and
163 ASEAN to Draft its First Human Rights Charter, Agence France Presse, Sept. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwid File.
164 See Clayton Jones, Asia Carves Out Own Ideas on Political Values, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1993, at 11 (quoting Sec. of State Warren Christopher's paraphrase of some Asian
criticism of United States efforts during a talk to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)).
165 See Sharma, supra note 41; see also Amyn Sajoo, A New Profile for Human Rights on ASEAN's
Agenda?, BUS. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at 28.
166 See Kunda Dixit, Human Rights: Asia-Pacific States Set Strong Agenda, Inter Press Serv., April
2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwld File (noting that India, the Philippines, Japan, South
Korea and Nepal spoke out for pluralism and civil liberties at the Bangkok conference in July; also quoting
a Japanese spokesperson as saying, "Human rights are universal ... these are values common to all man-
kind and they are a matter of legitimate international concern.").
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promoting increased understanding of, and compliance with, the human
rights norms contained in the convention. These functions also include, to
differing degrees, reporting or publicizing violations, and adjudicating and
enforcing certain sanctions to compel compliance.167
This model was rejected by many state representatives in Southeast
Asia, while being championed by non-governmental organizations in the
region.168 Such a proposal was considered by the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) in the early 1980s, but was not
accepted at the time. 169 Resistance to the idea ranged from disagreement
over whether any human rights norms were appropriate for Southeast Asia
to fear that a regional regime would be dominated by authoritarian govern-
ments unsupportive to the goals of human rights advocates. Subsequently,
the non-governmental Asian Human Rights Commission was established in
1983 out of frustration at the failure to create a regional inter-governmental
human rights commission. 170 To the extent that a non-governmental body
develops and maintains a reputation for neutrality and integrity, it should
enjoy some success in fulfilling some of the functions of the regional con-
ventions described above. For example, non-governmental organizations
like Amnesty International have succeeded in generating significant pres-
sure on governments to comply with stated norms by engaging in neutral
investigation and reporting. But a non-govemmental body lacks the
authority and legitimacy of an inter-governmental body. Thus, an inter-gov-
ernmental regional human rights commission has greater potential than the
non-governmental Asian Human Rights Commission for effectively deter-
ring and exposing human rights abuse in Southeast Asia.
Establishing a regional human rights regime would not be without its
problems. To be most effective, the convention should constitute bodies
with authority to interpret and, to some extent, report and enforce the human
rights norms established. Yet, to the extent that a regional body is given
broader and clearer authority to interpret and enforce human rights norms, it
is politically less likely to be created. However, since the UN General
Assembly voted to create the new post of a UN Human Rights
167 See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
168 These include the Human Rights Standing Committee of LAWASIA, which has set a long-term
goal of establishing an inter-governmental human rights commissions. See Leary, supra note 56, at 327-
28.
169 See Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/37/422 (1982).
170 See Leary, supra note 56, at 330.
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Commissioner at the close of 1993,171 Southeast Asia may face greater
attention from the increasingly powerful international human rights appara-
tus of the United Nations. This could be a further incentive to establish a
regional regime. In the final analysis, it is the development of the political
will of the people of the region which will be critical to the success of any
regional regime enforcing human rights in Southeast Asia.
There have been recent developments in Southeast Asia toward defin-
ing binding regional human rights norms and building the institutions to
enforce them. 172 In 1982, the non-governmental Regional Council on
Human Rights in Asia published the non-binding Declaration of Basic
Duties of ASEAN Peoples and Governments. 173 More recently, and more
significantly, there was a first-ever inter-governmental gathering of Asia-
Pacific states in Bangkok which drafted a non-binding, "Bangkok
Declaration" on human rights in Asia in preparation for the UN World
Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June of 1993.174 In
Bangkok, and again in Vienna, Southeast Asian nations were vocal in chal-
lenging the scope of the Western belief in universal human rights.
Southeast Asian states were put on the defensive in Vienna "for uniquely
lacking regional machinery that would promote and protect human
rights."'175 Months later, in October of 1993, ASEAN's Inter-Parliamentary
Organization (AIPO) adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights to
"show the world that we also practise human rights."'176 There are indica-
tions that ASEAN nations intend to move beyond rhetorical declarations
towards establishing "some sort of a regional mechanism to handle human
rights issues." 177 For example, Indonesia and the Philippines have already
established national human rights commissions. 178
Establishment of a neutral regional body to promote compliance with
regionally defined human rights norms, beginning with investigation and
reporting of violations, would be a first step. Southeast Asia would benefit
171 See Derwin Pereira, What Asia Expects from U.N. Commissioner of Human Rights, STRAITS
TIMES, Jan. 23. 1994, at 8.
172 See Leary, supra note 56 (for additional analysis of the steps taken to date in developing a
regional human rights system in Asia).
173 See Leary, supra note 56, at 329.
174 Dixit, supra note 166.
175 Sajoo, supra note 165, at 28.
176 ASEAN to Draft its First Human Rights Charter, Agence France Presse, Sept. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwid File (quoting Zahir Ismail, the president the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organization).
177 Pereira, supra note 171, at 8.
178 Sajoo, supra note 165, at 28.
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from a convention like the Banjul Charter of Africa, which includes a pro-
vision for educating people about the human rights norms contained in the
Charter as one of the tasks of its Commission. As a Special Rapporteur for
Asia from the United Nations stated, "what is lacking in the field of human
rights in Asia, is that moral conscience which prompts individuals to resist
repression and arbitrary disciplinary action taken by the government...."1 79
Although such "preventive" human rights work is less dramatic than mili-
tary operations, without essential preparatory work at the grass-roots level,
humanitarian interventions in Southeast Asia risk long-term destabilization
of international peace while providing an ultimately ineffective quick-fix.
B. How Should Humanitarian Intervention Be Practiced in Southeast
Asia
The development of new means of humanitarian intervention holds
more promise than refining the definition of humanitarian intervention.
Military forms of humanitarian intervention should continue to be prohib-
ited.' 80 In contrast, non-military forms of intervention should not only be
allowed, but further developed.181 This would reduce the pressure to use
military forms of humanitarian intervention.
Much of the opposition to humanitarian intervention is based on the
presumption that interventions will involve military force in violation of
Article 2(4). 182 The use of military force is controversial because the means
are antithetical to the end which is sought.'83 Killing people to prevent
them from killing people is usually acceptable only if it is deemed
"necessary."1 84 The meaning of necessity involves two important concepts:
1) that no other acceptable means are available which will accomplish the
desired end; and 2) that the desired end of humanitarian intervention, in its
179 Yougindra Khoushalani, Human Rights in Asia and Africa, 4 HuM. RTs. L.J. 403.440 (1993).
180 Cf AREND & BECK. supra note 72, at 179-85 (admitting that only one other legal scholar
believes Art. 2(4) no longer prohibits the use of force, this author argues that state practice has destroyed
legal viability of Art. 2(4)).
181 See generally Damrosch, supra note 125, at 5-13.
182 See, e.g., AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 112-13, 134-35; see also Scheffer, supra note 6, at
258 n.6, 264 (listing scholars who advocate narrow views of allowable military humanitarian intervention).
183 See Farer, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that, "[Tlhe instrument of intervention that we werejudging- force- is also the instrument of those whose acts are the occasions for our concern.").
184 See Delbruck, supra note 97, at 901 (arguing that humanitarian "enforcement measures could
only be resorted to as an ultima ratio.. .lawfully undertaken if enforcement measures short of the use of
military force have proven to be ineffective and if the military enforcement measures are applied propor-
tionately.").
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most basic form, is maximizing human rights compliance, particularly
through a net savings of human life.185 These two concepts highlight the
controversy over whether military forms of humanitarian intervention
should be allowed.
Strategies for opposing military forms of intervention can be catego-
rized according to their response to these two concepts. The first strategy
emphasizes the inefficiency of military methods to achieve the humanitarian
end. The argument is that military intervention does not result in a net sav-
ings of life. The second strategy emphasizes the need to fully develop and
then exhaust effective alternative means before resorting to military force.
1. Inefficiency of Military Intervention
The argument that military intervention is sometimes necessary to
achieve humanitarian goals rests on certain implicit assumptions. Those
who believe that military sanctions are effective for maximizing human
rights compliance and saving lives may be implicitly emphasizing short-
term versus long-term calculations concerning the loss of life associated
with using military forms of intervention. On the other hand, advocates of a
strict prohibition of the use of military intervention believe that the long-
term costs of allowing the use of military force for humanitarian ends, and
its concomitant risk of misuse, outweigh its short-term benefits in saving
lives. 186 For example, the strict prohibitionist might concede that a military
intervention in which 20,000 were killed, but 50,000 were saved, would
result in an immediate net savings of life. But the strict prohibitionist
would contend that this calculation is too short-sighted, and would speculate
that allowing military forms of humanitarian intervention would lead to
misuse of the exception as a pretext for ulterior political objectives. Such
politically opportune uses of humanitarian intervention would, in the long
run, lead to the loss of many more lives than would be saved.187 Thus, the
185 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991) (regarding what it means to be
necessary); see also AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 113; see also TESON, supra note 140, at 95-109
(providing a much more sophisticated analysis of utilitarian arguments for and against humanitarian inter-
vention, including discussion of relative weighting given to the lives of innocents versus combatants or,
violators.
18 See TESON, supra note 140, at 95-96.
187 See JANIS, supra note 63, at 166-67. See also AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 29. Cf Ian
Brownlie, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force, 1945-85, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 491, 500 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) (discussing the particular risks of mili-
tary humanitarian intervention on civilian populations).
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strict prohibitionist adds the lives lost (from a predicted long-term increase
in pretextual military interventions) to the initial short-term calculation
made by the military intervention advocate.188
The primary strategy for preventing the use of force has been to ban
the use of military force in international affairs, allowing only certain
exceptions. 189 The Kellogg-Briand Pact presumed that international agree-
ment to a mutual prohibition and renunciation of war would be a sufficient
deterrent. 190 World War II demonstrated the limits of this presumption. In
response, the UN Charter incorporated a broader prohibition against force or
the threat of force and coupled it with an institutional mechanism for inter-
pretation and enforcement through the "collective security" architecture of
the Security Council.191 But the many conflicts and interventions of both
the Cold War and post-Cold War eras have led many to question the effi-
cacy of this strategy. 192
2. Developing the Alternatives to Military Intervention
Activists who support humanitarian intervention should encourage
the development and acceptance of non-military forms of intervention. The
time is ripe for a new approach. The end of the Cold War represents a
historic opportunity to dramatically reassess how to control the use of force
in international law. 193 The final years of the Cold War witnessed dramatic
and effective use of nonviolent methods to topple or shake many of the
most formidable governments of the world. 194 Anti-militarists and defense
188 One advocate of humanitarian intervention argues for a utilitarian calculation which deducts
from the risk of misuse the risk of other doctrines being used as substitute pretexts if humanitarian inter-
vention were completely prohibited. It is an interesting argument, but neglects to add into the equation the
additional interventions which would be initiated if there were exceptions for humanitarian intervention.
See Wright, supra note 80, at 443. Cf TESON, supra note 140, at 96-107 (discussing various utilitarian
arguments for and against humanitarian intervention and arguing that "Humanitarian intervention can be
just even if the intervenor infringes the rights of innocents, and even if, in rare cases, more infringements
will occur than the intervention will prevent") (emphasis added).
189 See AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 31-33. See, e.g., The International Court of Justice, in
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), interpreted the exception for
self-defense in case of" armed attack" very narrowly.
190 See, e.g.. JANIS, supra note 63, at 166-67.
191 See AREND & BECK, supra note 72, at 177.
192 Id. at 178.
193 See JANIS, supra note 63, at 168.
194 See generally Tom Mathews, Decade of Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1991, at 32
(chronicling the primarily nonviolent revolutions and protests occurring around the globe from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, to the Philippines and China's Tiananmen Square).
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analysts have begun researching non-military forms of intervention and dis-
pute settlement in the international arena. 195 Further research and develo-
pment of these techniques provides hope for a solution to some of the
dilemmas of humanitarian intervention.
International law should allow and encourage the development of al-
ternative methods of non-military intervention for humanitarian purposes.
The development of effective non-military enforcement and dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms is a relatively new endeavor in international relations.
196
Its potential remains underdeveloped. Just as new advances in technology
have led to changes in how we solve technical problems. So too advances
in non-military strategies may lead to changes in how we solve social prob-
lems. 197  For example, many new manufacturing technologies have
compelled nations
and the law to adapt to changed economic, ecologic and social condi-
tions.198 Similarly, the behavioral changes that many hope the law will
effect may best be achieved by more aggressive development of non-
military dispute settlement mechanisms rather than relying on normative
prohibitions of military force. Further international and national resources
should be diverted from military technologies and strategies designed for
the conflicts of the Cold War to non-military initiatives and strategies
designed to resolve post-Cold War disputes. 199
There have been some interesting developments in this regard at both
the inter-governmental 200 and non-governmental levels which should be
195 See Gene Sharp, The Power and Potential of Nonviolent Struggle, NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS,
Spring/Summer 1990, at 2; see also Johan Jrgen Holst, The Peaceful Revolutions of Eastern Europe,
NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS, Spring/Summer 1990, at 5; see also Suzanne Pearce, Civilian-Based Defense
andPeacekeeping: Could this Marriage Work?. CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE. Autumn 1993, at 1.
196 See generally Conforti, Non-coercive Sanctions in the United Nations Charter: Some Lessons
From the Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 110 (1991) (for an attempt to learn from recent events).
197 See generally, The Albert Einstein Institution, NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS, Spring/Summer 1990,
at 6-22.
198 See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in
International Regulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF
SHARED LEADERSHIP 280 (Jessica Tuchman Mathews ed.. 199 1) (discussing the development and mainte-
nance of international regulatory regimes capable of responding to inevitable technological and social
1hang9. See Sharp, supra note 195, at 5; see also Binder, supra note 134 (noting encouraging signals in
this direction from the Clinton administration, "[Secretary of State] Christopher called for 'preventive
diplomacy' to keep the conflicts from spreading. He also endorsed 'new dispute resolution techniques,'
including some form of international arbitration .... ).
20u See COHEN, supra note 92, at I (creating emergency machinery for the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights to respond to human rights emergencies; stationing of human rights moni-
tors; and development of preventive strategies); see also Alston, supra note 97, at 172-174 (arguing that
1994
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supported. For example, the 5,000 member United Nations Volunteers,
administered by the UN Development Programme since 1970, may expand
its mission to include some form of non-violent presence in troubled coun-
tries. In addition, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has
proposed establishing regional training centers for the development of non-
military peacekeeping and peacemaking forces.201 In addition, many non-
governmental organizations have begun to develop skilled volunteer forces
prepared to intervene non-violently to prevent human rights abuses and help
resolve conflicts, utilizing techniques developed by Mahatma Gandhi,
Martin Luther King and a core of defense specialists researching possible
applications of these techniques in global affairs.2 02
Short-term interests have often prevailed over long-term interests in
international affairs. 203 Thus, it would be difficult to gain support for a
prohibition on military force through the implementation of structures
which address long-term cost. However, the world is showing greater signs
of sophistication in making longer-range cost/benefit policy choices, at least
in cases where future projections are plausible and serious. For example, in
the Montreal Protocol the international community severely curtailed the
economically lucrative (short-term), but ecologically catastrophic (long-
term), production of CFC's to protect the earth's ozone layer.204 Similarly,
claims of the long-term social costs of continued acceptance of the use of
military force could become more credible if empirical data corroborates the
long-term costs predicted by anti-militarists.
Absent such evidence, a prudent investment in the future of Southeast
Asia would be to explore the potential of nonviolent methods as an effective
the Security Council should have a significant human rights role, but that while "an armed enforcement
role might occasionally be warranted, it will risk being counter productive in a great many situations" and
that "greater involvement by the Security Council in response to human rights violations need thus not be
predicated upon a fundamental change in the Council's essentially non-military role.").
201 See Klaus Heidegger, Global Peace Service: New Vision or Reinventing the Wheel?
International Consultation on the Global Peace Service 1993, CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE, Winter, 1993-
94, at 6-8.
202 Id at 5.
203 See Richard Elliot Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 112, 144 (Jessica
Tuchman Mathews ed., 1991).
204 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-10. See generally, Benedick, supra note 203, at 144 (The chief U.S. negotiator for the United
States in the Ozone protection treaties summarizes the importance of politicians taking action based on
uncertain measurements of future costs, the need to improve measurement of those costs and the unity of
the scientific community in persuading policy makers of the reality of the future threat.).
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alternative to military might. Events in Eastern Europe, the Philippines,
China and elsewhere have shown that non-military methods can be success-
ful in re-shaping governments which abuse human rights.205 Herein lies a
bright hope for resolving the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War has revived the issue of military interven-
tion for humanitarian objectives. Dramatic abuses of human rights in
Southeast Asia tempt Western impulses to project global power to enforce
human rights norms. Some Southeast Asian states resist intervention by
claiming that they are not bound by Western interpretations of human rights
norms and should enjoy refuge, as sovereign powers, from the subjective
judgments of militarily stronger states. But as Bilahari Kausikan, Director
of Singapore's East Asia and Pacific Bureau, notes:
The traditional notion of sovereignty is being eroded by the
influence of television, environmental concerns, and the United
Nations. This tension is the defining characteristic of our time.
There's a false debate on whether human rights is relative to a
country's conditions or whether they are absolute. Of course,
there are universal values, but the core of the values is smaller
than the West believes. The debate is over the way that inter-
national norms are set, and that depends on the global
distribution of power.206
Legal scholars continue to debate broadened definitions of a doctrine
of humanitarian intervention in hopes of controlling its potential misuse and
increasing its usefulness in halting substantial human rights abuse.
However, definitional improvements will likely be less effective than politi-
cal and methodological changes in the determination and practice of
humanitarian intervention. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia
where: 1) "universal" norms are not widely accepted; 2) no regional
interpretive or enforcement machinery is in place; and 3) the region is
205 See NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS, supra note 195, at 6-14, 16-17; see also, Mathews, supra note 194
at 32.
206 Jones, supra note 164, at 11.
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highly susceptible to political manipulation by the current members of the
Security Council (notably China and the United States).
Two strategies offer greater promise for Southeast Asia. First,
development of a regional human rights regime like those in other regions
of the world would be more likely to control human rights abuse in the area.
Second, while military humanitarian intervention should continue to be
prohibited, non-military methods of intervention should be more aggres-
sively developed and granted greater legal legitimacy. Emphasizing these
two developments in the design of international law provides the best stra-
tegic choices for the promotion of human rights, while simultaneously
controlling the potential misuse of humanitarian intervention in Southeast
Asia. By adhering to standards of democracy and non-violence in interna-
tional law as it applies to Southeast Asia, we may not "rid the world of
scoundrels. But it will make it easier to tell them from us." 207
207 Roger Rosenblatt, Give Law a Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, §7, at I (book review).
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